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PELLEGRINO v. O'NEILL
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Connecticut Constitution states: "All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay."! Connecticut en
joys one of the highest per capita income levels but suffers from possi
bly the longest civil trial delays, and lowest ratio of trial judges
available for trial, in the country.2 Why one state encompasses both
statistics is a complex question. The question formed the underlying
basis for the claim asserted in Pellegrino v. O'Neill. 3
In Pellegrino, thirteen plaintiffs awaiting trial on civil actions in
the superior courts of the judicial districts of Hartford, New Haven,
Bridgeport, and Stamford brought suit against Connecticut's Gover
nor, treasurer, comptroller, chief court administrator, speaker of the
House of Representatives, and President of the Senate. 4 They claimed
that the delay in the specified districts 5 denied the citizens of the state
of Connecticut an adequate means of redress for their civil claims. 6
They cited insufficient appropriations as the cause of the delays,
sought a declaratory judgment finding the financing of the judicial sys
1. CONN. CONST. art. I § 10.
2. In 1983 Connecticut ranked second among the states in per capital income.
NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASS'N, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
1985 168 (1984) (quoting statistics derived from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis). At the same time it ranked 48 out of 50 in per capita expenditure on
its judicial system. McCollum, Court Backlog Termed One ofthe Nation's Worst, Hartford
Courant, Dec. 18, 1983, at AI, col. 1. Additionally, the state was third from the bottom in
a survey of 19 states measuring the number of full time judges per capita. McCollum, 300
Cases Being Sent to Rural Courtrooms, Hartford Courant, Oct. 18, 1983, at AI, col. 5. In
1983 delays approached 6 years in the civil system. Average delays in New Haven County
were 5 years 9 months; in Bridgeport 4 years 9 months; in Stamford 5 years and 1 month;
and in Hartford 5 years. McCollum, Backlog Prompts Lawsuit, Hartford Courant, June 17,
1983, at C1, col. 1. In comparison to counties of similar size, San Mateo County, Califor
nia, and Hampton County, Massachusetts, delays lasted 5 Y.l and 17 months respectively.
Id.
3. 193 Conn. 670, 672-73, 480 A.2d 476, 478 (1984), cert. denied and appeal dis
missed, 105 S. Ct. 236 (1984).
4. Id. at 672, 480 A.2d at 476.
5. The claimed average delays varied between 5 years 9 months and 5 days to 4 years
9 months and 9 days. Id. at 672-73, 480 A.2d at 478.
6. Id. at 673, 480 A.2d at 478.
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tern unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions,
and requested ancillary injunctive or equitable relief.7 The trial court
dismissed the claim as nonjusticiable. The state supreme court defined
the issue as the adequacy of the number of superior court judges ap
pointed by the legislature rather than the funding of the judiciary by
the legislature. 8 The supreme court held that the trial court would
have violated the doctrine of separation of powers had it directed the
legislature to appoint additional trial judges and agreed that the issue
was nonjusticiable. 9

II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Power of the Court

The Connecticut judiciary possesses the inherent power to direct
governmental agencies to provide the funds necessary "for the reason
ably efficient operation of the courtS."1O The court in Pellegrino
aligned Connecticut with the states holding that their constitutions
place a duty upon their judiciaries to insure that their legislatures do
not infringe upon individual rights and liberties by refusing to appro
priate necessary funds. 11 The courts base their reasoning on the prem
ise that the legislative power to appropriate funds potentially can
undermine the autonomy of the judiciary.l2 The judiciary, therefore,
in order to insure individual rights and liberties, must possess the abil
ity to appropriate adequate funding.
The power to appropriate is limited. If the judiciary overreaches
its constitutional mandate, the judiciary itself violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. 13 The rationale of the power lies in maintaining
7.

Id.
Id.
9. See id. at 671, 678, 480 A.2d at 477,481. The court, in finding that it possessed
both inherent and statutory power to increase judicial funding in appropriate circum
stances, concluded that the real issue concerned the adequacy of the number of judges
appointed by the legislature. The court's deduction must have been premised either on the
a perception that increased funding would not render the state judiciary more efficient or
that the status quo did not warrant the use of emergency powers.
10. Id. at 675, 480 A.2d at 479.
11. Id. at 675-76, 480 A.2d at 479-80; State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 23 A. 924, 926
(1892); Commonwealth ex. reI. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 56, 272 A.2d 193, 199, cert.
denied 402 U.S. 974 (1971). For a list of states with the position that the court possesses
the inherent power to order payment of expense "necessary for its efficient and effective
operation," see Annot., 59 ALR 3d. 569 (1974).
12. Comment, The Court's Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding 0/ Judicial
Functions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1700 (1982-83).
13. "The failure to recognize [the court's] limit by continuing to disguise the ultimate
8.
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the viability of the judicial system, not in providing the most efficient
system.
The Pellegrino court, in addition, found statutory authority for
the judiciary to appropriate funds for a constitutionally adequate sys
tem of justice. The court specifically cited CONN. GEN. STAT. section
4-84, which limits the governor's use of emergency funds except those
to be used "for the current expenses of any state court." 14 Other state
statutes indicate that the judiciary may freely appoint its own clerical
and administrative support personnel and that the executive must pro
vide courts with convenient places to conduct the business of the judi
ciary.ls The court concluded that the legislature recognized the
court's inherent authority to require that the proper authorities fur
nish funds. 16 Additionally, the court's logic is consistent with State v.
Staub, in which the court held in 1892 that the judiciary can compel
the comptroller of public accounts to perform a public duty in distrib
uting money that the General Assembly has allocated to a specific .
purposeP
The doctrine of inherent power does not include the power for the
judiciary to augment its numbers. IS If the judiciary could control its
numbers and funding, no limitation to its potential power would ex
ist. 19 Placing the power to appoint with the legislature, therefore, re
mains a cornerstone of the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers in Connecticut. 20
issue can only erode both the constitutional system of separation of powers and the public's
respect for judicial legitimacy." Comment, supra note II, at 1701.
14. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 676-77, 480 A.2d at 480; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-84
(1983).
15. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 676-78, 480 A.2d at 480-81; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51
51v, 27b, 27d (1983).
16. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 676-78, 480 A.2d at 480-81. Interestingly, the primary
statute forming the basis for the court's decision speaks to emergency situations, yet the
court barely discussed the statute in the context of an emergency. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4
84 (1983).
17. State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 569, 23 A. 924, 928 (1892).
18. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 678, 480 A.2d at 481.
19. Hazard, Comment: Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286,
1290 (1971-72); see infra note 24.
20. The Pellegrino court specifically referred to Brown v. O'Connell which held that:
[T]he power to organize courts and appoint judges is conferred by special
mandatory provisions, requiring direct action by the General Assembly, those
powers cannot be delegated, and the appointment ofjudges, in all cases where the
constitution has not been altered by amendment, can only be made by vote of the
Assembly.
Pellegrino at 678-79, 480 A.2d at 481, citing Brown v. O'Connell, 36 Conn. 432, 448 (1870).
Pellegrino thereby reaffirmed the Brown court's conclusion that the powers, being of pivotal
importance, can never be delegated.
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Justiciability

The Pellegrino court held that the trial court had not erred in
holding the complaint nonjusticiable. The supreme court continued:
Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy be
tween or among the parties to the dispute. . . (2) that the interests
of the parties be adverse. . . (3) that the matter in controversy be
capable of being adjudicated by judicial power. . . and (4) that the
determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the
complainant. 21

The supreme court reasoned that the only solution that offered the
plaintiffs practical relief would be the appointment of additional supe
rior court judges. Additional appointments, however, would violate
the third factor the court had delineated. 22
The third factor flows from the doctrine of separation of pow
ers.23 The Connecticut constitution strictly reserves the power ofjudi
cial appointment to the legislature. 24 The appointment of additional
superior court judges, therefore, is a political question. The Pellegrino
analysis, therefore, never reached the fourth question since the judicial
appointment of more judges represented the only practical relief.
21. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 674, 480 A.2d at 479 (citing State v. Nardini, 187 Conn.
109, 111-12,455 A.2d 304 (1982».
22. The majority cited many federal decisions in which the issue was held to be non
justiciable because the only solution was additional judicial appointments. Pellegrino, 193
Conn. at 685, 480 A.2d at 484 (citing Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v.
Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974»; De
Kosensko v. New York, 311 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 427 F.2d 351 (2d Cir.
1970); Kail v. Rockefeller, 275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); New York State Ass'n of
Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
23. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,208-14 (1962) (dicta that political questions are
nonjusticiable; held that reapportionment may be justiciable under equal protection analy
sis). In Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., the court stated:
The 14th Amendment neither implies that all trials must be by jury, nor guaran
tees any particular form or method of state procedure. . . In the exercise of that
power and to satisfy a public need, a state may choose the remedy best adapted, in
the legislative judgment, to protect the interests concerned, provided its choice is
not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the constitu
tional requirements of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931).
24. The Connecticut constitution explicitly grants the judiciary the authority to cre
ate additional superior court judges. It provides:
The judges of the supreme court and of the superior court shall, upon nomination
by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall be
prescribed. They shall hold their offices for the term of eight years, but may be
removed by impeachment. The governor shall also remove them on the address
of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.
CONN. CONST. art. V., § 2.
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Once the court found a political question, the argument became circu
lar, leaving no means of awarding practical relief.
Justice Peters, dissenting, relied heavily on Horton v. Meskill. 25
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Horton held that the legislation
funding public schools was unconstitutional.26 The Horton court did
not force immediate legislative action on school funding but allowed
time for the democratic process to provide a constitutionally accepta
ble solution. 27 The court also stated that declaratory judgments were
"peculiarly well adapted for the judicial determination of controver
sies concerning constitutional rights and, as in these cases, the consti
tutionality of state legislative or executive action."28 Justice Peters
concluded that a declaratory judgment similar to that in Horton would
appropriately settle the Pellegrino case. 29 Moreover, she expressed
concern regarding the logical juxtaposition of Horton and Pellegrino;
that a right to public education was fundamental and subject to strict
scrutiny while a right to a civil trial "without sale, denial, or delay"
did not enjoy the same status. 30
In Horton, the court limited the use of declaratory judgments to
cases involving threats to personal rights, justiciable controversies, ad
verse interests, actual or substantial questions, or notice. 3 ! The Horton
rationale presented a practical form of relief under which the court
could construe the matter to be justiciable. Given the broad nature of
the Connecticut statute that authorizes the superior court to render
declaratory judgments and the favorable reading normally given to the
non-moving party in a summary action, support exists for the Horton
25. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Subsequent to the Pellegrino decision,
Governor O'Neill appointed Justice Peters, who wrote the Pellegrino dissent, Chief Justice
of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
26. Id. The court subjected the legislation to strict scrutiny.
27. In Horton the court stated that:
In a case such as the present one, this circumstance [school funding] is of special
importance because the court, mindful of the proper limitations on judicial inter
vention, the problems inherent in the complexities of school financing and the
presumption that other departments of our government will accede to this court's
interpretation of the state constitution, may properly delay specific direction, af
fording time for corrective action and avoiding any serious interference with the
performance of their respective instrumentalities, funds and property.
Id. at 627-28, 376 A.2d at 365 (quoting Block, Suits Against Governmental Officers and the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1946».
28. Horton, 172 Conn. at 626, 376 A.2d at 365.
29. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 689-95, 480 A.2d at 486-88.
30. Id. at 689, 480 A.2d at 486; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3!. Horton, 172 Conn. at 627, 376 A.2d at 365.

,.
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approach. 32
Justice Peters also focused on the concept of "emergency." She
would not have read the complaint as strictly as did the majority.33
She would instead have read the claim for relief narrowly to be for
additional funding. She then would have agreed to hold, with the ma
jority, that the power to fund inheres in the state judiciary when its
ability to perform its constitutionally mandated duties were
threatened. 34 Using this line of reasoning the court would have two
forms of equitable relief in additional funding and a Horton style
judgment.
C.

Alternatives to Judicial Appointment

Substantial authority holds that the judiciary possesses no explicit
or inherent power to appoint additional judges. The question then be
comes whether any plausible alternatives exist to erode the Pellegrino
holding. In reading the complaint "broadly," the majority found the
problem caused by a shortage of superior court judges rather than a
lack of money.35 Impliedly, the court concluded that the financial sup
port which the superior court system received maximized their effi
ciency. If additional funds could have helped, the logic of the majority
opinion would have required the exercise of the inherent power of the
court to force judicial appropriations. 36 The exercise would also have
fulfilled the third and fourth justiciability requirements of having a
matter that can be adjudicated and for which the possibility of practi
cal relief exists.
The weakness of the assumption of efficiency makes the addi
tional appropriation alternative plausible. The question is not whether
money will solve the problem but whether additional funding will alle
viate the congestion. Money alone will not suffice but in the larger
cities "more money is plainly essential."37
Another alternative would be the adoption of a subsidiary system.
In Gentile v.' Altermatt,38 the court recognized no-fault motor vehicle
32. Id. at 626, 376 A.2d at 365 (quoting Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A.
891, 892 (1932».
33. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 692, 480 A.2d at 488.
34. Id. at 693-94, 480 A.2d at 488.
35. Id. at 678, 480 A.2d at 481.
36. Id. at 675, 480 A.2d at 479. The statement merely reflects the obverse of the
majority's argument. Its extensive discussion of inherent power, however, strongly indi
cated that if the court found that a lack of appropriations interfered with its ability to
perform its mandated functions, it would act promptly.
37. Hazard, supra note 19, at 1286.
38. 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
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insurance as an alternative remedy for the problems, "whether ma
chinery of justice is so burdened that justice is, in fact, denied to
many."39 The Pellegrino court found such an alternative not appropri
ate since the complaint addressed "the need for increased judicial
personnel. "40
The Pellegrino court left unanswered the question of whether it
could have issued a declaratory judgment to provoke a legislative re
sponse. The court stated as a "general rule that what [courts] cannot
enforce they cannot decree."41 A broader reading of the complaint to
include all possible remedies, however, may have sharpened the focus
of the alternatives. Indeed, the majority's interpretation of the com
plaint formed the basis of the dissent.
The Horton court broached the final alternative. It stated that if
the legislature has failed in its "expressly mandated" constitutional
duties, a court may properly attempt to provoke a legislative response.
To accomplish the objective, the court may issue a declaratory judg
ment and then "stay its hand to give the legislature an opportunity to
act."42 The Horton approach resulted from its awareness that a court
must minimize its intrusion into constitutionally mandated legislative
functions. The Horton court specifically emphasized that courts
should be extremely cognizant of the limitations of judicial
intervention. 43

39. !d. at 308, 363 A.2d at 21. The court specifically focused on the congested condi
tion of the civil courts as the underlying factor that made dismissal reasonable. Id. at 308,
363 A.2d at 22. For a more complete discussion of the alternatives to the auto tort process
see Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation's Auto Insurance Study and Auto Acci
dent Compensation Reform, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 207 (1971).
40. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 682, 480 A.2d at 483. Neither the drafter of the com
plaint nor the local press read the complaint so narrowly. Wesley Horton, an attorney for
the plaintiffs, said, "The whole system of financing our judicial system is unconstitutional
. . . . The legislature hasn't passed a statute that adequately funds the judicial branch of
government." Legal Attack Begins to End Court Backlog, Hartford Courant, August 23,
1983, at B3, col. I.
41. Pelegrino, 193 Conn. at 683, 480 A.2d at 483 (quoting Clarkes Appeal from Pro
bate, 70 Conn. 195, 209, 39 A. 155, 159 (1898)).
42. Horton, 172 Conn. at 651, 376 A.2d at 375.
43. The Horton court stated:
[T]his circumstance is of special importance because the court, mindful of the
proper limitations on judicial intervention, the problems inherent in the complexi
ties of school financing and the presumption that other departments of our gov
ernment wi11 accede to this court's interpretation of the state constitution, may
properly delay specific direction, affording time for corrective action.
Id. at 627-28, 376 A.2d at 365.
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CONCLUSION

Connecticut faces a crisis in its judicial system. One of the
wealthiest states should not have one of the most ineffective systems to
redress grievances. 44
Mere delay can transform the civil system "into a nightmare of
inefficiency and inequity"45 for the average plaintiff, who must "do
without any compensation until the end of the trial."46 In the
meantime living expenses increase and earning power decrease due to
the injury.47 As a result, parties may not be operating at arm's length
and insurers may be placed in a superior bargaining position. 48 "Ex
tended delay may vitiate the relief finally obtained, especially if money
is urgently needed and the prospective recovery is the victim's sole
financial asset."49 If delays affect negotiation of bodily injury claims,
they also affect the substantive rights of the parties. The system that
tolerates the delays is, therefore, perverting "business relations, labor
management relations and international relations."50 If the parties
can manipulate the system so substantially, a true emergency exists
because the courts are not fulfilling their constitutionally mandated
duties.
In Pellegrino the court had an opportunity to comment and act
on excessive civil trial delays. The court framed the issue so as to
avoid alternative approaches such as the one taken in Horton. The
44. See supra note 2.
45. J.O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 49 (1975).
46. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT, THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENT 136 (1970); Franklin, Chanin and Mark, Accidents. Money. and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (1961).
Supra note 45 at 140. Mary D. Pellegrino said of her seven year wait, "I don't understand
the court system. . . . It just made me feel like my case was important to me and nobody
else cared . . . . It makes you feel like the system only works for some people." McCollum,
Court Backlog Termed One of Nation's Worst, Hartford Courant, December 18, 1983 at
AI, 18, col. 1.
47. See authorities cited supra note 45.
48. Excessive delay may affect the insurers position in the litigation process. Delay
impacts on accounting systems, for example, because loss reserves continue to earn interest
prior to settlement. Another impact results in the decreased ability of plaintiffs to marshall
their evidence as time passes. Conversely, insurers may argue that their file maintenance
costs increase and that plaintiffs may use videotapes and depositions. Plaintiffs, of course,
are caught between the concern about expense and the fact that they must prove their
cases. Poor plaintiffs may have to accept a lower figure due to the cost of litigation, press
ing medical bills, liens and pressure from collection agencies. Finn, Our Uncivil Courts:
Where You Need a Strong Case and a Strong Constitution, Hartford Courant, January 29,
1984, at N.E., 10, col. 1; O'CONNELL, supra note 44; Ross, supra note 45, at 139-40.
49. Franklin, Chanin and Mark, supra note 45, at 30.
50. Ross, supra note 45, at 136.
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court, therefore, placed the burden of developing a solution squarely
on the back of the legislature. Since the problem is political, and the
court placed it on the body expressly responsible for it, the court chose
an eminently safe position.s l

Walter E. Paulekas

51. In 1984, Connecticut courts' caseloads decreased slightly in part because the ju
diciary had spent considerable effort on its own and with the legislature to address the
problem. Hansen, On the Courthouse Steps, Connecticut Law Tribune, November 5, 1984,
at I, col. 1; Smertanka, State Courts Manage to Reduce Pending Court List, Hartford Cou
rant, July 18, 1984, at Cl, col. 1; Gombossy, Speziale Names Panel to Study Case Backlog,
Hartford Courant, October 26, 1984, at C2, col. 2.

